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United States companies are operating in an increasingly globalized economy.
Each day, goods, services, and information seem to flow with less and less regard
to national borders. In the United States the value of export shipments in 1988
exceeded $520 billion, accounting for approximately 11 percent of the Gross
National Product (GNP).' Indeed, the value of exports of goods and services
from the United States increased by approximately 40 percent, in real terms,
from 1982 to 1988.2
The flow of goods, services, and information out of the United States, how-
ever, is not unfettered. The U.S. export control laws, like those of many other
industrialized nations, restrict exports for reasons of national security, foreign
policy, and scarce domestic supply. 3 The export laws usually are aimed at stem-
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1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS 2, table 1.1 (Feb. 1989). GNP in 1988 was $4,863.1 billion. Id.
2. Id. table 1.2; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1989, at 421 (1989).
3. The terms "export control laws" and "export laws," as used herein, refer to: (1) the Export
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and its implementing
regulations, the Export Administration Regulations of the U.S. Department of Commerce, 15
C.F.R. pts. 768-799 (1989); and (2) § 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778
(1988), and its implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations of the U.S.
Department of State, 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-133 (1989). The State Department regulations govern the
exportation of "defense articles" (as defined therein) and related technical data and services. The
Commerce Department regulations govern the exportation of all other commodities and technical
data, including those that have both defense and nondefense applications. The Commerce Depart-
ment and the State Department export controls together apply to all exports of products and data from
the United States.
A third set of export controls, the Foreign Assets Control and Transaction Control Regulations of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. pts. 500-565 (1989), implements the Trading with
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ming the unauthorized flow of U.S.-origin products and data by imposing po-
tentially severe penalties on the "U.S. exporter" of those products or data. The
most pervasive set of export controls, those of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, defines "U.S. exporter" as the "person who, as the principal party in
interest in the export transaction, has the power and responsibility for determin-
ing and controlling the sending of the commodities and technical data out of the
United States.
' 4
In reality, the U.S. exporter usually is the entity in the United States (regard-
less of nationality) that actually makes the shipment out of the United States. The
U.S. exporter may, however, be an entity located abroad that controls the ship-
ments of exports to it by a U.S. company or person.
To attain the broader objective of preventing (or penalizing U.S. companies
for) unauthorized exports, the export laws contain pitfalls for U.S. companies
that do not themselves export what they produce, but merely supply it in the
ordinary course of business to the U.S. exporter. In practice, most enforcement
action has been taken against only the U.S. exporter or against the coconspirators
with the U.S. exporter. Depending on the circumstances, a nonexporting U.S.
manufacturer may face the risk of export enforcement action and potential lia-
bility when it enters into domestic transactions with other U.S. companies that
export the manufacturer's product, either as supplied or as incorporated into
another product.
The typical scenario is one in which the U.S. manufacturer sells its product to
another U.S. company. The purchaser then incorporates the product into another
product, which could be used in both civilian and military settings, and subse-
quently sells the new product to both domestic and foreign purchasers.
In another fairly typical scenario, the U.S. manufacturer sells manufactured
pieces to another company in the United States. The purchasing company uses
the pieces as part of a system, also in the United States. This system is then sold
to a second purchaser, also a U.S. manufacturer, that incorporates the system in
the United States into a final product that the second purchaser potentially may
export to purchasers abroad.
This article examines the circumstances under which the nonexporting U.S.
manufacturer may face enforcement action and potential liability for export
violations committed by the domestic purchasers of its products. Section I
describes the types of conduct by a U.S. exporter that could implicate a nonex-
the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The Treasury Department
export controls actually consist of specific restrictions that apply to selected individual countries
(e.g., Iran, Cuba, South Africa, Libya) and, in some cases, only to certain kinds of transactions. The
Treasury Department controls, where they apply, supplement the Commerce Department and State
Department export controls. The export prohibitions vary widely among the different sets of con-
trols, and the regulations, on their face, do not appear to extend to nonexporters. For these reasons,
discussion of the Treasury Department export controls has been omitted from this article.
4. 15 C.F.R. § 770.2.
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porting manufacturer. Section II then provides an analytical framework for as-
sessing the potential liability of the nonexporting U.S. manufacturer in domestic
transactions that may result in the ultimate export of its products. Section II also
discusses the extent of the nonexporting U.S. manufacturer's duty to inquire into
the backgrounds of purchasers that may export its products or data. Finally,
section III offers some precautionary measures that a nonexporting U.S. man-
ufacturer may take to minimize, if not eliminate, its potential for liability under
the U.S. export laws.
I. Possible Export Violations by a Domestic Purchaser
The Commerce Department Administration Regulations and the State Depart-
ment International Traffic in Arms Regulations contain various licensing require-
ments and other restrictions on the conduct of would-be exporters. This section
outlines the types of prohibited conduct by a domestic purchaser of the product
of a nonexporting U.S. manufacturer that could conceivably subject the U.S.
manufacturer to potential liability. The focus thus is primarily on the liability of
a nonexporting U.S. manufacturer that is "derivative" of the conduct of its
domestic purchaser (or the purchaser's customer) that is the actual "U.S. ex-
porter." The U.S. manufacturer's liability when it is a direct exporter, or its
liability for conduct in which it intentionally engages independent of its pur-
chaser, is only briefly treated herein.
A. COMMERCE DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS
The Export Administration Act (EAA) itself contains few actual statutory
prohibitions. The majority of the Commerce Department export control of-
fenses, as well as the licensing requirements, are contained in the Commerce
Department's regulations.
Certain kinds of conduct, such as the purchaser/exporter's failure to comply
with the EAA's recordkeeping requirements, would appear to be solely attrib-
utable to the purchaser and would in no way implicate its nonexporting U.S.
supplier. Other types of conduct by the purchaser/exporter could expose the non-
exporting U.S. manufacturer to liability, and the manufacturer thus should be
aware of the possibility of their occurrence. These include situations where:
(i) the purchaser exports commodities or data incorporating commodities
received from the U.S. manufacturer without obtaining a validated li-
cense when such a license is necessary;
5
(ii) the purchaser exports commodities or data incorporating commodities
received from the U.S. manufacturer in violation of the terms of a
general or validated license;
6
5. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.3(a).
6. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 787.6, 787.11(a)(v).
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(iii) the purchaser misrepresents or conceals a material fact on an export
document;
7
(iv) the purchaser possesses commodities or technical data incorporating
commodities received from the U.S. manufacturer that are controlled for
national security or foreign policy reasons, with the intent to export
them in violation of the EAA or regulations, or with knowledge or
reason to believe that they would be so exported;8
(v) the purchaser engages in a restrictive trade practice or boycott against
Israel or fails to report a request to participate in such a boycott;9
(vi) the purchaser takes any other action to evade the requirements of the
EAA or regulations. 
10
1. Criminal Sanctions
Criminal penalties may be imposed on a person who "knowingly" engages in
any of the above acts.'" Penalties for knowing violations include a fine of the
greater of five times the value of the exports or $50,000 and/or imprisonment for
up to five years. 12
More severe penalties exist for certain of the above acts that are "willful."1 3
In particular, a fine of the greater of $1 million or five times the value of the
exports and/or imprisonment for up to ten years may be imposed on corporations
and other nonindividuals who commit willful violations in categories (i) and (ii),
where the exports are knowingly sent to Eastern bloc countries or other desti-
nations controlled for foreign policy purposes. 14 These sanctions also may be
imposed for "willful" conduct in categories (iv) (possession with intent to
violate Act) and (vi) (evasion of Act). ' 5 Criminal penalties may also be imposed
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for making false or misleading statements to, or
concealing material facts from, the Commerce Department or another govern-
ment agency. 16
Judicial interpretations of the Commerce Department criminal provisions are
sparse. Courts have noted a difference between "knowing" and "willful" vi-
olations, but have yet to clearly analyze this distinction. 17 The state of mind
7. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 787.1(a)(2), 787.5(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
8. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(3); 15 C.F.R. § 787.4(b).
9. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407; 15 C.F.R. Part 769.
10. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(4); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(a)(l)(D).
11. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(a)(1)(i).
12. Id.
13. See generally 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b); 15 C.F.R. § 787. I(a)(l)(ii).
14. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(1); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(a)(l)(ii)(A).
15. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(3), (4); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(a)(I)(ii)(C) & (D).
16. 15 C.F.R. § 787. 1(a)(2).
17. See United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550, 552-53 (D. Mass. 1983) (distin-
guishing without analysis "knowing" and "willful" violation).
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required to satisfy the "knowing" standard seems less than that required to meet
the "willful" standard. Presumably, the difference is that "knowing" violations
could include performance of the prohibited act with actual knowledge or reason
to know that the conduct is prohibited. Thus, because it may incorporate the
"reason to know" standard, the knowing test conceivably could impose liability
on a criminally negligent violator. In contrast, "willfulness" appears to require
specific intent to bring about the prohibited result, in addition to knowledge of
the violation. The Commerce Department only recently obtained its first indict-
ment under the "willful" provisions of the EAA.18
2. Civil and Administrative Sanctions
Civil and administrative sanctions also may be imposed for any of the above
categories of violations, regardless of whether any criminal penalties are im-
posed. 19 The language of the statute and the regulations suggests that civil
sanctions are assessed on a "strict liability" basis. In other words, they may be
imposed simply for violations of the EAA, and knowledge and intent are irrel-
evant. 20 One court, however, has read the EAA to require proof of a knowing
violation before imposing civil sanctions. 2' Moreover, the Commerce Depart-
ment, as a matter of enforcement policy, has imposed civil sanctions only on
knowing violators of the EAA and the regulations.22
Civil and administrative sanctions include: (1) suspension, revocation, or
denial of export privileges; (2) exclusion from practice before the Commerce
Department; (3) civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation and up to
$100,000 for each violation involving national security controls; and (4)
administrative seizure and forfeiture of the violating exports. 23 The EAA
suggests that the choice of which civil sanctions to impose may be based on
factors such as the seriousness of the violation, the culpability of the violator,
and the violator's record of cooperation with the government in disclosing the
violation.24
18. See United States v. Mukkar (W.D. Wash. filed Aug. 17, 1989).
19. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c); 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b).
20. See id.
21. Spawr Optical Research, Inc. v. Baldridge, 649 F. Supp. 1366, 1371 (D.D.C. 1986).
22. Telephone conversation with Mr. Mark Menefee, Policy Analyst, Office of Export Enforce-
ment, Bureau of Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. Even if knowledge is
required for civil liability, most commentators agree that an exporter need not evince an intent to
violate the export laws in order for the government to impose such civil penalties or administrative
sanctions. See, e.g., Davidson, Enforcement of the Export Administration Act, in COPING WITH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS 1985 (Practising Law Institute, May 1985); Hunt & Breed, Export Administration
Act-Penalties and Enforcement Process, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 1989 (Practising
Law Institute, Mar. 1989).
23. 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b).
24. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(4).
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B. STATE DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS
Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act 25 and the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations 26 set out the kinds of conduct prohibited with respect to the
exportation of defense articles, defense services, and technical data. Certain
violations of the State Department export controls by a domestic purchaser that
could implicate the nonexporting U.S. manufacturer are similar to the violations
of the Commerce Department controls, discussed above. Other violations, such
as failure to comply with the registration requirements, are unique to the State
Department scheme and may reflect on a U.S. manufacturer's knowledge of a
given domestic purchaser's ability to lawfully export end products containing the
manufacturer's commodities.
In sum, the following potential violations by a domestic purchaser warrant
caution on the part of the U.S. manufacturer in any potential export transaction
involving defense articles or data controlled by the State Department:
(i) the purchaser, or a subsequent purchaser (including the direct exporter),
fails to register with the Department as a manufacturer or exporter of
defense articles, as appropriate; 27
(ii) the purchaser, or a subsequent purchaser, exports defense articles with-
out obtaining a license where no exemption from the licensing require-
ments applies;
28
(iii) the purchaser, or a subsequent purchaser, imports defense articles for
use in the manufacture of the end product incorporating articles received
from the U.S. manufacturer; 29
(iv) the purchaser, or a subsequent purchaser, misrepresents or conceals a
material fact in an export control document. 30
1. Criminal Sanctions
Unlike criminal penalties imposed under the EAA and the Commerce
Department regulations, the Arms Export Control Act and the State
Department regulations impose criminal liability only for violations that are
both "knowing," and "willful." 31 Criminal penalties include fines of up to
$1 million and/or imprisonment for up to ten years.32 Courts have held that
willfulness "connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty. . . . Congress did not intend to impose criminal penalties on innocent or
25. 22 U.S.C. § 2778.
26. 22 C.F.R. pts. 123, 125, 127.
27. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A); 22 C.F.R. § 122.1.
28. See 22 U.S.C. § 2278(b)(2); 22 C.F.R. § 123.1.
29. See 22 C.F.R. § 123.2.
30. See 22 U.S.C. § 2278(c); 18 U.S.C. § 1001; 22 C.F.R. § 127.2.
31. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c); 22 C.F.R. § 127.3.
32. Id.
VOL. 24, NO. 4
U.S. EXPORT LAWS-NONEXPORTERS' LIABILITY 1035
negligent errors. 33 Because of this high intent standard, it is not surprising
that no reported case has been found in which a nonexporting domestic
manufacturer has been criminally prosecuted for export violations committed
by its purchasers. Additionally, in most of the criminal cases the violations
committed by the direct exporter (or one who aided, abetted, or conspired
with the exporter) were so flagrant, and the schemes so devious, as to
indicate that the defendants clearly intended to violate the export laws. The
courts apparently will not punish innocent or even negligent violations of the
State Department export regulations with criminal sanctions.
2. Civil and Administrative Sanctions
Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act authorizes the State Department to
impose the same kinds of civil and administrative penalties that the EAA
empowers the Commerce Department to impose and explicitly refers to the
authorizing provisions of the EAA.34 State Department civil and administrative
penalties are similar, but not identical in all respects, to those that the Com-
merce Department may impose. The State Department may suspend, on an
interim basis, or debar, for up to three years, any person from participating in
the export of defense articles or services for previous or suspended violations of
the export laws. 35 Suspension and debarment by the State Department corre-
spond roughly to the "suspension, revocation, or denial" of export privileges
by the Commerce Department. 36 Defense articles sought to be unlawfully ex-
ported also are subject to seizure and forfeiture, as under the Commerce De-
partment scheme. 37 Finally, the limit on civil fines for violations of the State
Department controls is $500,000 per violation, an amount substantially higher
than the maximum permissible under the EAA and under the Commerce De-
partment regulations.
38
The Arms Export Control Act is silent regarding the standard for imposing
civil or administrative sanctions. Given the Act's reference to the language of the
EAA authorizing the Commerce Department to assess such sanctions, the stan-
dard under the Arms Export Control Act also appears to be something akin to
"strict liability."
33. United States v. Adames, 683 F. Supp. 255, 256 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (quoting United States v.
Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1978) ). Accord United States v. Golitschek, 808 F.2d 195, 201-03
(2d Cir. 1986) (willfulness connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty); United
States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 450 (7th Cir. 1980) (defendant need not know he was specifically
required to have export license, only that his conduct in exporting goods is violative of the law);
United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1976) (willfulness connotes a voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty).
34. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c).
35. See 22 C.F.R. 88 127.6, 127.7.
36. See 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b)(1).
37. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e); 22 C.F.R. § 127.5.
38. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e); 22 C.F.R. § 127.9.
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II. Potential Grounds for Imposing Liability
on a Nonexporting U.S. Manufacturer for
Export Violations by Its Domestic Purchaser
There are two groups of circumstances under which a U.S. manufacturer
might incur liability when another U.S. party to which it sells products violates
the export laws. First, the manufacturer may be held liable as an accessory when
it actively engages in the violation in concert with the purchaser. The Commerce
Department regulations render any person who engages in the following kinds of
activities an accessory subject to the full panoply of criminal, civil, and admin-
istrative sanctions under the EAA:
" causing, aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, procuring,
or permitting any violation of the EAA or regulations;
39
" soliciting, or conspiring to commit, a violation of the EAA or the regula-
tions;
40
* acquiring an export license for another person (such as a purchaser) because
that person has been denied export privileges, or otherwise acting ficti-
tiously as principal or agent for another person (such as a purchaser) who
actually is effecting the export;
4 1
" taking any other action, either independently or through any other person,
with the intent to evade the provisions of the EAA or any regulation.
42
The State Department regulations likewise contain a broad accessorial liability
provision making it unlawful for any person to "willfully cause, or aid, abet,
counsel, demand, induce, procure or permit the commission of any act prohib-
ited by [section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act or any regulation]." 43 For
such active and knowing, and presumably willful, participation in its purchaser's
export violation, the nonexporting U.S. manufacturer's risks of incurring not
only civil, but also criminal, penalties are significant.
Second, the nonexporting U.S. manufacturer's liability depends on its
actual knowledge, or the knowledge legally imputable to it, at the time of the
transaction with its U.S. purchaser. There are two broad types of situations
against which the U.S. manufacturer must be most careful to insulate itself
under both the Commerce Department and the State Department export control
schemes:
(a) transacting with knowledge that the purchaser is likely to commit an
export violation; or
(b) transacting with a purchaser that has been denied export privileges.
39. 15 C.F.R. § 787.2.
40. Id. § 787.3.
41. Id. §§ 787.11(a)(4), 787.12(a)(1).
42. Id. § 787.5(b).
43. 22 C.F.R. § 127. 1(d).
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A. TRANSACTING WITH KNOWLEDGE OF PROSPECTIVE VIOLATION
The Commerce Department regulations provide:
No person may ... sell, . . transfer, . . . [or] forward, ... in whole or in part, any
commodity or technical data exported or to be exported from the United States, which
is otherwise subject to the Export Administration Regulations, with knowledge or
reason to know that a violation of the Export Administration Act or any regulation,
order, or license has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to occur with respect to
any transaction."
Thus, the Commerce Department regulations, in theory, subject to export vio-
lation penalties anyone who is negligent in dealing with an entity that subse-
quently exports the product sold in violation of the EAA and regulations.
The parties to a normal arm's length transaction generally are not charged with
special "knowledge," nor are they under any special duties to disclose. Accord-
ingly, the potential exposure of a seller dealing at arm's length with a violating
purchaser would seem to rest more often on the seller's: (a) actual knowledge
regarding the buyer's future export plans for the merchandise; (b) knowledge
based on information reasonably available to the seller; or (c) knowledge from
inferences reasonably drawn from available facts.
This provision appears to be little used in practice; the Department has rarely,
if ever, taken enforcement action against any party other than the "U.S. ex-
porter" or one acting in concert with the U.S. exporter. 45 There are circum-
stances, nevertheless, where a seller conceivably could be chargeable with
knowledge that an arm's length purchaser of the seller's product was about to
violate the export laws. If, for example, the purchaser was being evasive re-
garding the ultimate end use or destination of the product purchased (or the
buyer's product incorporating the purchased product), the seller should at least
be suspicious of the potential for illegal exports. The Commerce Department
recently published a list of "red flags" that could signal to a U.S. exporter that
its product would be diverted or otherwise exported illegally. Although this list
is aimed at advising a U.S. exporter of potential deceptive behavior by a foreign
purchaser, some of the listed behaviors equally serve to alert a domestic manu-
facturer selling to another U.S. company that the purchaser may subsequently
engage in an unauthorized transaction.46
44. 15 C.F.R. § 787.4(a) (emphasis added).
45. Telephone conversation with Mr. Mark Menefee, U.S. Department of Commerce.
46. The Commerce Department has identified the following factors as indications of possible
illegal exports. The Department cautions that, although there can be legitimate commercial reasons
for some of these factors to appear in a transaction, exporters should be alert to the possibility of
illegal activity when they are present:
" The customer or purchasing agent is reluctant to provide end-use or end-user information.
" The performance or design characteristics are incompatible with the consignee's line of business
or the environment or level of technical development in the stated country of destination.
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The State Department regulations do not contain a broad provision imposing
sanctions on a person who sells defense articles in the United States or knows or
has reason to know that its purchaser will commit an export violation. Trans-
acting with such knowledge, however, conceivably could subject the seller to
liability under the State Department's broad proscription against "aiding,"
"abetting," or "permitting" the commission of a violation.47
To avoid being charged with liability for permitting a violation by its pur-
chaser, a domestic seller should be wary of three circumstances that would
automatically disqualify the purchaser from obtaining a license to export defense
articles: (a) the nationality of the purchaser (because foreign persons may not
obtain a State Department Export License); 48 (b) any indication by the purchaser,
either by an expression of intent or past practice, that the purchaser may export
a defense article to the destination for which the State Department, as a matter
of policy, will not issue a license;49 or (c) a previous violation by the purchaser
of either the Arms Export Control Act and regulations or certain other U.S.
criminal statutes.
5 0
As a matter of enforcement policy, the State Department generally does not
seek sanctions against domestic sellers of products that are incorporated into
"defense articles" that subsequent U.S. purchasers export in violation of the
Arms Export Control Act and the State Department regulations. This is particularly
true where the domestic seller's product is not itself a "defense article" controlled
* The stated end use is incompatible with the product's capabilities.
" The stated end use is incompatible with the technical capability of the consignee or the desti-
nation country.
" The customer is willing to pay cash for a large item.
" There is little or no business background information about the customer available.
" The customer appears unfamiliar with the product's performance characteristics or uses.
" The customer declines installation, training, or maintenance services that are normally accepted
in similar situations.
" The delivery dates are vague, or the delivery locations are not consistent for the commodity.
" Freight forwarders are listed as ultimate consignees.
" The shipping route would not normally be used for shipments to the stated final destination.
" The intermediate or ultimate consignee is in a business that would not normally handle this type
of transaction.
" Packaging or repackaging requirements are unsuitable for the stated method of shipment or
destination.
" Evasive responses are given to questions about any of the above or to whether the equipment is
for domestic use, export, or reexport.
OFFICE OF EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, INDICATIONS OF POTENTIAL. ILLEGAL EXPORTS (undated).
47. See 22 C.F.R. § 127.1(d).
48. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1(b), 120.11, 120.23.
49. These destinations include Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Kampuchea, Latvia, Lithuania, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Vietnam, Iran, Libya, Syria, South Yemen (P.D.R.Y.),
Angola, Chile, and any other country with respect to which the United States maintains an arms
embargo. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(a),(d),(e).
50. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.24, 127.10.
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by the State Department. If the domestic seller's product is a "defense article,"
however, the seller should take all necessary precautions to ensure that its purchaser
knows that the product is subject to State Department export controls and cannot be
exported without a license from the Office of Munitions Control. t Such precautions
are suggested in the concluding section of this article.
B. TRANSACTING WITH A PURCHASER DENIED EXPORT PRIVILEGES
The nonexporting U.S. manufacturer's greatest risk of exposure under the
export laws occurs if it engages in a potential export transaction with a domestic
purchaser that has been stripped of its ability to lawfully export. Both the Com-
merce Department and the State Department export control regulations impose
penalties on persons who transact with parties whose export privileges have been
revoked, suspended, or denied. The Commerce Department regulations simply
prohibit persons from directly or indirectly buying, selling, or otherwise partic-
ipating in any transaction with a person denied export privileges that may involve
exports of commodities or technical data subject to the jurisdiction of the Office
of Export Licensing at the Commerce Department.52 The State Department
regulations similarly impose sanctions on persons who transact with persons
subject to orders of debarment or interim suspension, if such persons do so with
knowledge of the debarment/suspension order.
53
Because the Commerce Department regulation contains no explicit knowledge
requirement, it appears to hold a domestic seller strictly liable for selling to a
person subject to a revocation, suspension, or denial order where there is a
possibility that the commodity sold may be exported either as received or as
incorporated into another commodity. Moreover, even if a knowledge require-
ment could be read into the regulation, it is reasonable to assume that such
knowledge would be readily imputed, because notices of suspension, revocation,
or denial of export privileges are published in the Federal Register and are thus
matters of public record. Commerce Department practice confirms this view.
54
Similarly, despite the express knowledge requirement found in the State De-
partment regulation, constructive knowledge that a prospective purchase is sub-
ject to debarment/suspension would be legally imputable to a domestic manu-
facturer/seller, given the publication of orders of debarment and suspension in the
Federal Register.55
In sum, the public nature of both the Commerce Department and State De-
partment sanctions involving suspension, revocation, or denial of export privi-
51. Telephone conversation with Mr. Kenneth Chard, Deputy Director, Office of Munitions
Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
52. 15 C.F.R. § 787.12(a)(2).
53. 22 C.F.R. § 127. 1(c).
54. Telephone conversation with Mr. Mark Menefee, U.S. Department of Commerce.
55. 15 C.F.R. pt. 788.
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leges gives rise to an affirmative duty on the part of a domestic manufacturer/
seller to inquire into the status of any other party engaged in a transaction
potentially involving exports. Further protective measures are discussed below.
III. Conclusion: Protective Measures
There are two types of precautions that a nonexporting U.S. manufacturer can,
and should, take in order to minimize its exposure in any sales transaction with
a domestic purchaser that may export the manufacturer's product or incorporate
it into an exported commodity. First, the U.S. manufacturer should conduct a
very basic factual investigation of its prospective customer. Second, in sales
contracts with such customers, the manufacturer should obtain: (1) assurances
that the purchaser has not been, and is not currently, subject to export enforce-
ment action; (2) warranties that the buyer will comply with all export require-
ments of the United States; and (3) indemnification assurances from the buyer for
violations of those warranties that result in civil or criminal fines imposed by
either the Commerce Department or the State Department.
A. FACTUAL INVESTIGATION
As discussed above, a U.S. manufacturer's greatest risks of exposure under
the export laws for violations committed by its domestic purchaser arise where
the manufacturer sells products to a purchaser with knowledge or reason to know
that a violation has occurred or is likely to occur, or where the manufacturer sells
products to a purchaser subject to a published administrative denial of export
privileges. The manufacturer's derivative liability in these instances would be
based upon what it knows or should have known. Accordingly, the suggestion
that the U.S. manufacturer should engage in a factual investigation of its cus-
tomers when negotiating transactions with them carries with it the obvious dan-
ger of increasing the range of knowledge imputable to the manufacturer in a
given transaction. Nevertheless, the U.S. manufacturer clearly would be charge-
able with certain kinds of information under virtually all circumstances. The
point of the U.S. manufacturer's factual inquiry, then, should be primarily to
gather the information that an enforcement agency likely would consider it to
have "reason to know." Obtaining this knowledge in advance of any transaction
also will permit the manufacturer to make an informed and reasoned decision
regarding the risks inherent in proceeding with the sale.
The kinds of information that a U.S. manufacturer could be alleged to have
"reason to know" include the following:
9 whether the purchaser intends to export or reexport items containing the
manufacturer's products;
* the ultimate consignee and ultimate destination of the exported product (this
advises the U.S. manufacturer whether, for example, the purchaser plans to
VOL. 24, NO. 4
U.S. EXPORT LAWS-NONEXPORTERS' LIABILITY 1041
export defense articles to a destination usually prohibited, as a matter of
policy, by the State Department);
* if the exported commodity (or the manufacturer's product) appears to be
subject to State Department jurisdiction, whether the purchaser is a "U.S.
person," as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations;
" if the exported commodity (or the manufacturer's product) appears to be
subject to State Department jurisdiction, whether the purchaser has regis-
tered with the Department as a "manufacturer" or "exporter" of defense
articles;
" the extent of the purchaser's familiarity with U.S. export controls;
* whether the purchaser has ever been subject to an order of debarment,
suspension, or other denial of export privileges, or has been subject to any
other criminal or administrative sanctions for export violations;
* whether the purchaser currently is subject to any order of debarment, sus-
pension, or other denial of export privileges.
Evasive answers to these types of questions should put the U.S. manufacturer on
notice that the domestic purchaser may intend to engage in an unauthorized
export or reexport transaction.
In addition to requesting this information from the purchaser, the U.S. man-
ufacturer should ascertain independently that the domestic purchaser is not in-
eligible to export pursuant to an order of suspension, debarment, or other denial
or revocation of export privileges by consulting agency publications and the
Federal Register. Commerce Department orders are contained in Supplement
Numbers 1 and 2 to Part 788 of the Export Administration Regulations, 56 pub-
lished several times per year by the Bureau of Export Administration under the
title "Denial Orders Currently Affecting Export Privileges." These Supplements
may be updated between publication dates by checking the Federal Register for
newly issued orders. The States Department does not publish an updated list of
debarment/suspension orders. Orders affecting the domestic purchaser (or its
parent, subsidiary, or affiliate) may be found by checking the Federal Register.
B. CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS
Once a nonexporting U.S. manufacturer determines that there is even a
possibility that its domestic purchaser may export an item containing a
product of the manufacturer, it should attempt to obtain warranties in which
the purchaser ensures that it will comply with all applicable export controls
and that future purchasers of the items likewise will comply with such
controls. Samples follow:
(1) Buyer warrants that it is, and will remain, in compliance with all export require-
ments, including, but not limited to, the requirements of the Export Administration
56. Id.
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Act and regulations, the Arms Export Control Act and regulations, and any orders
and licenses issued thereunder. Such requirements include, but are not limited to,
obtaining all proper authorizations or licenses from the Department of Commerce
or the Department of State for the export or reexport of any item, product, article,
commodity, or technical data. Buyer further warrants that it will not export, reex-
port, send, sell, deliver, or otherwise transfer items, commodities, articles, prod-
ucts, or technical data in violation of the requirements of any law, regulation, order,
or license of, or issued by, any agency of the government of the United States.
Buyer additionally warrants that it has not been, and is not cuirently, debarred or
suspended from or otherwise prohibited or impaired from exporting, reexporting,
receiving, purchasing, procuring, or otherwise obtaining any item, product, article,
commodity, or technical data regulated by any agency of the government of the
United States.
(2) Buyer warrants that it will take all reasonable and appropriate steps, including, but
not limited to, obtaining warranties, guarantees, or other assurances, to ensure that
any other person or entity purchasing or otherwise procuring any item, article,
product, commodity, or technical data, or any part or component thereof, produced
or manufactured by the buyer and containing an item, article, product, part, or
component produced or manufactured by Seller, will not export or reexport such
item, article, product, or commodity in violation of any law, regulation, order,
license, or any other requirement of the government of the United States.
To properly effectuate these warranties, the nonexporting U.S. manufacturer
might consider obtaining an indemnification from the purchaser, such as the
following: "Buyer agrees to indemnify Seller and hold Seller harmless from any
costs, penalties, or other losses caused by, or related to, any violation of the
warranties contained in this contract."
Nonexporting U.S. manufacturers should be aware of the limited effect of
these warranties and other protective steps. The nonexporting U.S. manufacturer
cannot contract away its liability vis-d-vis the U.S. Government, nor can any
protective steps guarantee with absolute certainty that the U.S. manufacturer will
not be subject to criminal or civil penalties or administrative sanctions. Never-
theless, these relatively simple protective measures do provide evidence that the
nonexporting manufacturer was not intending to commit, aid, abet, or conspire
in export violations and that it was acting in good faith and making all efforts to
comply with the export laws and regulations.
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